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What and where is an octopus’s mind?
Response to Commentary on Mather on Octopus Mind
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Department of Psychology, University of Lethbridge
Abstract: It is gratifying to see the thorough discussion of whether octopuses have a mind,
though perhaps a mind that is different from those of “higher” vertebrates. It stimulates us to
look at the welfare of these animals and challenges us to find better ways to test mindfulness
and cognition across animals with widely differing natural histories and sensory and motor
capacities.
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1. Introduction. Behavior is expressed by the whole animal, not smaller and smaller
components. That is what fascinated me about animal behavior in the first place. I completed
my doctoral work in human perception; one of the lessons of the Gestalt psychologists was
that “the whole can be more than the sum of its parts”. What I took this to mean practically is
that the whole animal controls and expresses behavior and the whole animal is programmed
by its mind. Reproductive strategies, for example, are undoubtedly urged on by hormone
levels and guided by information received by the brain; but they also result from assessing
the competition, the quality of potential mates, the likelihood of a better choice, or that a
dominant individual is watching. We need to know how behavior and the mind are the result
of combinations of its component pieces, but we have to start with the whole.
2. Can we have a complete and agreed-upon definition of mind? Several commentators
suggest that I operationalize the contents of my discussion: Mallatt says the key terms were
not defined; Correia Caeiro asks for operational definitions. Some propose a definition: King
& Marino that animals “reason about how to negotiate the world around them and respond
flexibly”, Mallatt that they can “adjust their behavior to solve problems, to learn a lot, to
explore and play”, and Porcher, at greater length, that “octopuses have an ‘I’, a self-serving
awareness or consciousness controlling the manipulation of the mental concepts, making
moment to moment decisions about the proceedings and keeping its goals in mind as it
pursues life”. According to Corcoran, “minded organisms are … actively sampling and
interrogating their environment to procure informative sensory data”.
Dictionaries, which tend to be human-centered, are not a lot of help. Collins says “your
mind is your ability to think and reason”, Merriam-Webster that it is “the organized conscious
and unconscious mental activity of an organism”. No one definition will make everyone
happy, but taking advice from these sources and systematizing my discussion, I would define
mind as “the entity which controls behavior of an organism — not just taking in and storing
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information but seeking it (as in exploration and play), organizing it, and flexibly using it in
choice and control of output”. This definition emphasizes that minds are active in all three
areas — input seeking, organization and output planning — and see Mather’s (2019) Figure
1. It reminds me of Shettleworth’s (2010) definition of cognition, as “the mechanisms by
which animals acquire, process, store, and act on information from the environment”, though
I would specify that this includes the internal as well as the external environment, so perhaps
minds “do” cognition, though they may do more than that.
3. Do we need to postulate a mind for octopuses? Several commentators are more
comfortable with a simpler explanation of behavior. Mehrkam believes that there is a more
parsimonious explanation of these capacities and that operant behavior can produce the
variety of abilities that octopuses demonstrate, but that would still not account for
information seeking). Ginsberg and Jablonka (2019) suggest that sentience is the
evolutionary result of Unlimited Associative Learning, but that too may be too narrow.
Learning theories do not explain the drive to acquire information. Corcoran’s well-presented
explanation suggests that information-seeking behavior, which does not seem to result in
overt learning, is instead driven by the need to gain data that will fuel creative solutions to
novel future problems. This counters Gutfreund, who thinks that we only interpret simple
trial-and-error learning by animals as the cause of something more complex because our
assessment of animal cognitive abilities is “observer-dependent”. The simplest explanation
for actions is not necessarily the correct one; isolating small steps of a complex process in a
laboratory setting may lose the context in which they were expressed. Amodio admonishes
us to be “agnostic” about our assumptions, but if you make no hypotheses, you cannot test
them. Schnell & Valloritgara are uncomfortable with the term “mind”. They see it as an
immeasurable concept, preferring instead to be guided by mechanistic accounts and
underlying neural processes. Yet the Gestalt psychologists remind us that studying the
component pieces will not necessarily help us understand the whole; a controlling “mind”
may be “ill-defined” yet still there.
4. Where is the octopus mind? The need to evaluate whether the octopus mind is unified
arises because its nervous system appears to be so physically distributed. It is an oft-quoted
fact that 3/5 of the octopus’s neurons are in the arms, not in the brain. There also appears to
be no somatotopic representation of the periphery in the brain. This led Grasso (2014) to
suggest that octopuses have “two brains”, with a somatosensory representation
manufactured by the whole arm neural complex. There is no doubt that much lower-level
processing is carried on by the chains of brachial ganglia. Schwartz — based on his mistaken
belief that Wells (1978) had found that octopus arms could be conditioned independently of
each other — concludes that the octopus system is a “community of independent minds”
because of this peripheral processing. This is echoed by Favela, who says that the octopus
has multiple systems and possibly multiple Umwelten rather than a single Umwelt. CarlsDiamante (2017) has also suggested that consciousness in the octopus may need to be seen
as distributed. Yet there is no evidence of higher-level processing in this complex of ganglia,
just lower-level sensory-motor adjustment. Godfrey-Smith is less sure of peripheral
“minds”. He believes that octopuses might have a single “self” and that attention can “pull
together” the animal, but that arm motions may be semi-autonomous. Gutnick et al.’s (2011)
studies show that the octopus brain can indeed learn cues from vision for arm actions and it
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can dictate arm motions. We need to remember that the extensive neural processing in the
arms is used for controlling the complex set of muscles in the boneless muscular hydrostat
movement system (Kier and Smith, 1985), not necessarily for “decision making”. My own
view is that the distribution of control does not lead to a distribution of mind. For example,
although it undoubtedly programs the grasping and manipulation involved, lower-level
organization of arm actions does not participate in the “decision” of an octopus to carry
separated coconut halves out onto the soft sand surface for later use as shelter (Finn,
Tregenza & Norman, 2009).
The contrast between the centralized vertebrate and the decentralized mollusk may
be more quantitative than qualitative. My target article described the vertebrate spinal cord
as having considerable autonomy. Pellis notes that our extensive gastrointestinal system is
separate from the voluntary motor one, and Adamo notes that the human cerebellum has
recently been found to contribute to complex cognitive reasoning. Embryological studies by
Shigeno et al. (2018) show, first of all, that the cephalopods are closely related not to the
gastropods with their distributed paired ganglia but to the amphineurans with their cordlike early embryonic nervous system. The developmental model of the cephalopod nervous
system may thus be similar to the cordal one of the vertebrates and the arthropods, and the
brachial arm nerve cords similar to the human spinal cord. Who knew? we had to wait for the
embryologists. Octopuses, like humans, function as a single unified organism despite having
many different brain areas. Perhaps in both the human and the octopus, the level of behavior
is unified, although the underlying brain appears not to be. For example, lateral specialization
to some extent appears to be common in bilateral brains across several phyla (Shillicock et
al. 2019), yet the behavior is not laterally driven. Porcher simply says that: “there is an ‘I’, a
self-serving awareness” and the octopus “behaves as if it is centrally controlled”.
It is not that there is nothing to be learned by evaluating the octopus’s combination of
neural organization, mind and intelligence. Cephalopods are not vertebrates; their
intelligence has clearly not evolved similarly to ours (Packard). Carls-Diamante points out
that our views of cognition are biased towards vertebrates; the octopus challenges the
vertebrate-based explanations of cognitive functioning. Aitken writes that our
“anthropocentric generalizations will be of limited use in understanding cephalopod
cognition”, Vonk that selection will generate different solutions to similar problems in the
two groups, and Pellis that these findings generate a major challenge to our vertebrate
perspective. This is all especially true because the prevailing view is that high intelligence is
assumed to evolved to solve social problems, not environmental ones. This is clearly not true
for the non-social or minimally social cephalopods (Guerra). Lee urges us “to re-examine our
very primate-centric concept of mind, memory and the consequences of sociality and a long,
slow life history for intelligence”. One hopes that this will open the door for a wider and truly
comparative psychological view of intelligence, as new information about complex behavior
in animals such as fish and insects (Vonk) indicates we must.
5. How may we use this information in the discussion of welfare? This presentation of
octopuses as mindful and sensitive raises more than just theoretical concerns. The Cambridge
Declaration on Consciousness opened our understanding to the possibility that, having
consciousness, cephalopods deserve ethical consideration. While welfare concerns have been
extended to cephalopods in research in Canada since 1991, and are present in a few other
countries as well, it was only when the European Union decided that cephalopods deserved
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ethical consideration in a variety of situations (Smith et al. 2013) that our awareness of the
welfare of these animals came into wider consideration. As Browning points out, husbandry
standards for cephalopods are in their infancy (although see Fiorito et al. 2015 for European
information and the exemplary AITAG 2014 treatment of aquarium care standards for the
giant Pacific octopus, Enteroctopus dofleini). Standards for care and treatment of all
invertebrates are noticeably absent in the United States. King & Marino note that the Marine
Biological Laboratory in Woods Hole is scaling up its efforts to develop cephalopods as
models for manipulative and invasive studies — after all, in the US, there are no demands for
ethical consideration of this group. Jacquet, Franks & Godfrey-Smith point out that
researchers from several different countries are hoping to develop octopus “farming”, with
practices that go against the welfare of these probably sentient animals. The recent
publication of the book The Welfare of Invertebrate Animals (Carere & Mather 2019) will give
us much-needed information about how we will carry out protection of not just cephalopods
but also many of the other invertebrate groups who, after all, constitute 98% of the animals
on the planet. We need more voices asking for good welfare for more animals; as Jones (2013)
notes, current animal welfare policies lag behind or even ignore the science in animal
sentience and cognition, especially in the United States. Noel-Guery states that among the
criteria for sentience in animals is pain. Whether animals of any group feel pain is a subject
of considerable controversy (see Key 2016 and accompanying commentaries in a recent issue
of this journal).
6. What are the next steps? As several commentators discussed, one of the problems in
trying to understand the behavior and minds of not just octopuses but all cephalopods is a
lack of information. This is especially true about field observations: Although oceans make
up 3/5 of the surface of the planet and much more of the habitable volume, many areas are
inaccessible to human observers. Perhaps future commentators on this exchange will be able
to propose observable conditions and testable hypotheses as Bueno-Guerra and Amici (2018)
did in their advice for testing cognition in a collection of “non-standard” animals, including
the octopus. One approach comes to my mind: we believe that octopuses do not process visual
information exactly as mammals do. Feng, Chouinard, Howell & Bennett (2017) recently
evaluated the susceptibility of animals to visual geometric illusions. All the subjects they
found were vertebrates (except the bees) and most were mammals: How would an octopus
respond to these stimuli? Other suggestions for situations to test the octopus mind are
welcome.
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